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Abstract
This study done at the Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) explored how the VTS operators (VTSOs) communicated with ships 
and other actors in the maritime sociotechnical system and how decisions were made with regard to assisting traffic in 
maintaining safe passage in port areas, where most vessel movements are seen and accidents occur. The fieldwork was done 
during four independent visits to a VTS centre under the Swedish Maritime Authority, with a total sample of six VTSOs 
and one VTS instructor. The qualitative data were sorted and coded using a grounded theory approach. The data pointed at 
non-technical information processing and communication factors that play a role in decision-making and ultimately in safety. 
During protocol operations at the VTS, these factors influenced how VTSOs judged the skills of the vessels’ bridge teams, 
and how they approached them. This is a time where much effort is being put into upgrading technological systems, and 
these will have the power to change the ways in which the maritime network obtains and processes information, as well as 
how they can communicate with each other. The further development of technological systems, work protocols and training 
programmes can benefit from taking the soft aspects of communication and the needs of the operators and their tasks into 
account for the enhancement of safety.
Keywords Safety · Control · Information processing · Decision-making · Trust
1 Introduction
Shipping is a self-organizing network where each ship is 
its own principal decision-maker and responsible for main-
taining own safe operations (de Vries 2017). Whereas in 
general terms the domain is a loosely coupled (Orton and 
Weick 1990) sociotechnical system with distributed control 
(Hollnagel et al. 2006; Praetorius 2014), safe navigation and 
manoeuvring of large vessels within Vessel Traffic Service 
(VTS) areas are activities that require coordination between 
the navigators onboard the ship and the shore-based VTS 
centres (de Vries 2015; Praetorius 2014). Decision-making 
is based on communication between ship and shore opera-
tors and on local information integration for preparation and 
prediction (de Vries 2015, 2017).
The VTS is an internationally defined shore-based organ-
ization by the International Maritime Organization (IMO 
2017) and the International Association of Marine Aids 
to Navigation and Lighthouse Authorities (IALA 2016), 
physically distributed through different VTS-jurisdiction 
areas around the globe and locally instigated by a Compe-
tent Authority (IALA 2016). VTS-jurisdiction areas are, 
according to the IMO’s A.578 resolution (IMO 2017), those 
confined channels with high-traffic density in the proximity 
of ports, where most vessel movements and accidents occur 
(Brödje 2012). Ships entering a VTS area must report to 
the respective VTS, and although the ship captain is still 
responsible for the vessel’s own operations, the VTS will 
have a range of responsibilities and influence over the traffic 
within its geographical area. This range of responsibilities 
can vary from simple Information Service (INS) to Traffic 
Organization Service (TOS), to Navigational Advice and 
Assistance Service (NAS), decided at a national level (IALA 
2009, 2016).
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INS is the most basic service provision worldwide (IALA 
2016). INS refers to the provision of vital and opportune 
data through the very high frequency (VHF) radio for vessels 
in the VTS area to make safe navigational decisions and for 
situations where vessels will meet. These relevant data for 
navigation range from traffic in the vicinity, meteorological 
information and temporary events in the fairways, as exam-
ples. TOS is intended to help coordinate traffic regarding 
speed limits and authorizing berthings. NAS has an active 
support role in ship bridge navigational decision-making by 
providing advice, positions of other traffic, a vessel’s course 
and speed or warnings to a vessel (IALA 2016).
This paper is a result of fieldwork at a VTS centre with 
INS delivery. The intent of the fieldwork was to explore the 
operations of the VTS with regard to how the VTS opera-
tors (VTSOs) communicated with ships and other shore 
operators, and how decisions were made to assist the traffic 
in maintaining safe passage in port areas. During this pro-
cess, non-technical communication factors that influence the 
VTSOs’ judgements, expectations and assistance to ships, 
and reflect challenges in the role of the VTS, were iden-
tified. This paper describes these aspects complementing 
previous research (Bruno and Lützhöft 2010; Brödje et al. 
2010, 2013; de Vries 2015; Praetorius and Hollnagel 2014; 
Praetorius et al. 2012, 2015) in the deeper understanding of 
everyday VTS operations through naturalistic field observa-
tions, specifically with regard to the non-technical factors 
which lack documentation in the literature. This knowledge 
is important because it reflects the ways in which the VTSOs 
adapt to the challenge of limited information sources for 
situational awareness and trust building (Brödje et al. 2010; 
de Vries 2017), communications and predictions at a dis-
tance, and lack of role directives (Brödje et al. 2013), as well 
as how this impacts their judgements and assistance to ships. 
This can have a bearing on new developments of technologi-
cal systems (de Vries 2017), work protocols, regulations and 
training programmes.
2  Theoretical background
Communication establishes a relationship between two or 
more parties in the exchange of information and feedback 
(Flin et al. 2008; Miller 2012). This generates knowledge, 
helps predict behaviour patterns, and is essential to main-
taining good teamwork, safety and efficiency. Communi-
cation is comprised of four components (Flin et al. 2008): 
what (the content to be communicated); how (the means and 
shapes through which the content is communicated); why 
(the reason for communicating); and who (those with whom 
the content is being communicated).
As in Crew Resource Management (CRM) training, 
the VTSOs are trained in keeping a closed-loop feedback 
communication model (Brödje et al. 2013) and using the 
Standard Marine Communication Phrases (SMCP) defined 
by the IMO (2001) (a code followed by all maritime pro-
fessionals, containing a set of communication standards). 
Closed-loop communications require that the sender and 
the receiver of the communication content work together to 
accomplish a mutual understanding and that confirmation 
and potential correction of content are facilitated (Flin et al. 
2008) to increase accuracy and reliability of information and 
thus predictability of behaviour.
The general systems theory of Cybernetics, which from 
the Greek means “steersman” or “rudder” (Miller 2012; 
Skyttner 2005; Woods and Hollnagel 2006), refers to a 
closed-loop feedback model in terms of maintaining con-
trol of a dynamic and complex system being steered, con-
trolled and regulated (Woods and Hollnagel 2006) towards 
the achievement of system goals (Miller 2012), allowing 
the system’s behaviour and response to be better predicted 
(Skyttner 2005). The same is true in control theory, where 
continuous feedback loops of information are necessary 
to maintain control and for a system to remain within its 
safety boundaries (Dekker and Pruchnicki 2014). Regulat-
ing the system depends thus on communication (Johansson 
and Persson 2009; Skyttner 2005), information processing, 
planning/adaptation and decision and is measured through 
the extent to which the system is achieving its intended goal 
(effectiveness), with a minimal use of resources (efficiency), 
and contributing to the goals of the higher-level system in 
which it is contained (efficacy) (Skyttner 2005).
Communication, information integration (de Vries 2015) 
and trust (Bruno and Lützhöft 2010; Brödje 2012) have been 
described as key factors in navigational assistance for main-
taining safe and efficient operations at sea. Particularly, spo-
ken communications through VHF radio or cell phone help 
to reduce uncertainty (Johansson and Persson 2009), gain 
insight into the skill of the navigator and build trust (Bruno 
and Lützhöft 2010; de Vries 2015), as well as help the VTSO 
get a perception of the standpoint of the crew (Bruno and 
Lützhöft 2010) and build a mental model of the local traffic 
(Brödje 2012). However, a previous study by Brödje et al. 
(2013) concluded that regardless of the fact that the VTSOs 
had full situational awareness of a given critical instance in 
the channels, they sometimes chose to refrain from inform-
ing bridge officers or pilots of safety aspects when in situa-
tions not subjected to a protocol. The authors suggested that 
this problem was linked to insufficient directives to delimit 
and guide the responsibilities of the VTS, and to the VTSOs’ 
anticipations that the bridge officers and the pilots would 
react negatively towards them.
Previous research has pointed at the ambiguity of the INS, 
TOS and NAS services provided by different VTS centres 
(Nuutinen 2005, 2006; Praetorius and Lützhöft 2012). The 
issue of homogenizing the delivery of VTS across the globe 
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has been under debate in IALA (2013), which should help 
foreign vessels better understand what to expect from and 
report to VTSOs, as well as build trust in them (Nuutinen 
2005; Praetorius and Lützhöft 2012).
As trust between the actors in the maritime context is 
built around how roles are being performed and not around 
personalities or personal relationships (Bruno and Lützhöft 
2010), the ambivalence of the VTS role and/or the notion 
that the VTS stands at a lower hierarchical level than the 
mariners (Brödje et  al. 2013) immediately represents a 
communicational barrier, notwithstanding the fact that the 
actors are not co-located. It helps the mariners to build trust 
in the VTSOs if they can sense that the VTSOs have an 
understanding of their standpoint and have their best inter-
ests at heart (Bruno and Lützhöft 2010). For the VTSOs, 
however, their trust and reliance on the mariners that they 
have a good idea of what is happening in the fairways based 
on the way they manoeuvre the vessel and/or communicate 
over the VHF radio often keeps the VTSOs from communi-
cating certain information to the mariners that they expect 
the mariners already know (Brödje et al. 2013). The VTSOs 
try to avoid providing what they fear is redundant infor-
mation to the mariners and seeming arrogant (Brödje et al. 
2013). In this sense, although trust helps promote effective 
communication and safety performance, it can also have the 
opposite effect (Cox et al. 2006; Sætren and Laumann 2015; 
Schöbel 2009).
3  Methods
This study utilized a qualitative research approach to data 
collection and analysis (Creswell 2014; Czarniawska 2014; 
Patton 2002), which is appropriate to capture non-technical 
factors in communication at the VTS. Inductive reasoning 
was used to argue for general principles based on empirical 
evidence.
The general aim of the fieldwork was to learn about the 
VTS everyday operations (information exchange and com-
munications) in a complex and dynamic work environment 
(Stanton et al. 2013), monitoring and assisting traffic in 
maintaining safe and efficient passage in port areas. The 
fieldwork consisted of four independent visits to a VTS 
centre (who provided INS) administered by the Swedish 
Maritime Authority (SMA). The first visit began with a 
briefing given by a VTS instructor on the general purposes 
of the VTS and of the specific INS service offered. Here, a 
description was given on how VTSOs are trained to com-
municate with vessels in everyday circumstances as well 
as in more dangerous situations, such as near-collision or 
near-grounding. This session was followed by four sepa-
rate instances of naturalistic direct observations (Patton 
2002; Stanton et al. 2013) of VTS normal operations and 
communications (no accidents were observed during field-
work). During the observations, the VTSOs were asked pre-
prepared open-ended questions as well as opportunistic clar-
ification questions about the vessels’ movements observed 
on the electronic charts, information being received or VHF 
radio communications taking place, among other aspects of 
their work.
Each visit had the duration of 3 to 5 h, beginning at dif-
ferent hours of the morning to try to capture different traf-
fic patterns, change of shifts and the hand-over procedure 
between VTSOs. Each visit would observe the work of two 
VTSOs, making up a sample of six VTSOs. The VTSOs 
followed their regular schedule, and our observations took 
place out of convenience and availability of the centre, arbi-
trarily resulting in two of the VTSOs being observed twice 
on different days. All of the respondents had studied nautical 
sciences and/or had significant onboard experience before 
becoming VTSOs.
In accordance with an informed consent form signed 
by each respondent, the sessions were audio-recorded and 
annotated. Codes began being devised during fieldwork as 
patterns were identified, and this spawned initial questions 
and theories which helped determine the aspects to follow 
up next (theoretical sampling) (Corbin and Strauss 2008; 
Czarniawska 2014; Orr 1990). The audio recordings were 
later transcribed verbatim, and the transcriptions were high-
lighted where relevant according to the codes, and memos 
were written (Corbin and Strauss 2008). The process of cod-
ing and of understanding relationships (axial coding) was 
iterative and incremental, based on the grounded theory 
approach (Corbin and Strauss 2008). This analysis resulted 
in five groupings of data that describe the symmetries found 
in the work of the operators, presented in Sect. 4, repre-
senting non-technical communication factors interpreted to 
influence decision-making and the safety of operations in the 
system: role ambiguity; judgement, trust and overreliance; 
language proficiency, acquaintances and frequency of visits; 
norms, patterns and expectations; closed-loop versus open-
loop communications. From these findings, further literature 
was studied to help understand and support the observed 
phenomena. Similar analyses have been frequently used in 
the context of complex sociotechnical systems studies (e.g., 
Sætren and Laumann 2015), including in the context of navi-
gational assistance (e.g., Brödje et al. 2013; de Vries 2017).
The field studies with naturalistic observations and open-
ended questions were useful tools to investigate everyday 
operations and communication patterns at the VTS centre 
under study. Although a sample of six VTSOs and one VTS 
instructor may be small, the sample was representative of 
this particular centre (six out of seven VTSOs that work at 
this centre) and the number of visits resulted in data satu-
ration. As this centre is situated in one of the most traffic-
intense areas in Sweden and provides the most common 
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service globally, INS, the general conclusions taken here that 
resulted from empirical evidence are considered indicative 
of the mechanisms of other VTS centres with an INS role.
Qualitative research is not intended to culminate into 
statistical or numerical data, as much as grounded theory 
coding is not meant to be rigid and can be done at differ-
ent levels of analysis. This suits the purpose of gaining an 
understanding—and creating/providing a description—of 
phenomena with a particular nature that cannot be directly 
quantified (Corbin and Strauss 2008; Langford and McDon-
agh 2003). The knowledge created is an outcome of the 
researcher’s interpretation of the observed phenomena, 
and thus results may vary depending on the researcher, but 
the careful inspection and search of symmetries in the data 
ensure ecological validity and the rigour of the findings 
(Corbin and Strauss 2008; Orr 1990). The methods used in 
this study are replicable.
4  Results
An individual VTS workstation is mainly characterized by 
the VHF radio communications and the computer monitors 
with the electronic chart with integrated radar and Automatic 
Identification System (AIS) information through which the 
VTSO monitors the traffic situation in their respective VTS 
geographical area, along with the use of other information 
systems or services (e.g., email, pilot schedule, weather fore-
cast) (see Fig. 1).
The VTSOs described their centre as an aid to the naviga-
tors in achieving safety, efficiency and environmental protec-
tion, and making arrival more convenient for the vessels, by 
providing them with the necessary information at the right 
time so that they can adjust their Estimated Time of Arrival 
(ETA) when/as needed, as the VTSOs have local experi-
ence and knowledge of the local traffic (“We are here to give 
the best updated information (…) to prevent accidents”). 
Safety—just like environmental protection—was generally 
described as the avoidance of accidents or taking the right 
measures to “minimize impact” in case of an incident or 
accident, but in practical terms the concept of safety seemed 
to be more individual and subjective, based on operator 
knowledge and experience (“What is safe or not safe is a 
lot up to the person sitting here and what kind of knowledge 
you bring in. If you have been a captain for 20 years, you 
make one judgement. If you’ve been for 2 years or not at all, 
then you make a different judgement”) (see also Praetorius 
and Lützhöft 2012). As to what helps achieve safety, this 
resulted in a multifaceted discourse: safety depends on nor-
mal and recognizable communication and navigational pat-
terns accounting for parameters such as weather conditions, 
bathymetric data and vessel characteristics. The VTSOs’ 
responsibility was described as providing good information 
and confirming that the vessels understood said information 
and what was happening in their vicinity (“When it comes to 
the information we give out, it could be that it’s consistent, 
that it follows the same pattern so it’s recognizable; that we 
don’t talk too much—just give the essential information”). 
Part of this task was about monitoring traffic and making 
sure vessels kept following a “normal pattern”.
From the standpoint of providing remote assistance, VTS 
operations depend on the information received via sensors 
on computer systems, and on VHF radio voice communica-
tions. The latter include protocol reporting communications 
and influence essential judgements and safety decisions. 
The results of the fieldwork list the non-technical factors 
Fig. 1  Individual work station at the VTS centre
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(described in the following subheadings) that impact judge-
ment and decision-making.
4.1  Role ambiguity
The VTS centre under study has an INS role intended to 
monitor local traffic and operations, and inform passing ves-
sels. Despite this, it was observed that the VTS performed 
activities overarching all three services (see Sect. 1 for a 
definition of these services).
The VTS can ask questions to clarify the vessels’ inten-
tions, give a warning (e.g., “Warning: You are heading for 
shallow waters”), or even provide advice from a general per-
spective, but usually once vessels have reached an agree-
ment as to how they will meet, the VTS is not to intervene. 
Moreover, the VTSOs can only assist traffic up to a certain 
point and will not interfere when accidents are just about 
to take place, as there is a point where VTS interference is 
thought to actually do more harm than good (“It’s about two 
minutes until they will have their closest point of approach. 
Now, I would say it is too late for us in the VTS, because 
you always come through the limit where you do more harm 
than you will do good”; “If they are going to come a little bit 
close, then I know what their intentions are, so I am not that 
worried. But it is very difficult to say as well, because you 
can have a manoeuvre problem very soon”).
The VTS instructor preferred that advice was given 
with caution, not to risk the VTS being misinterpreted by 
vessels as having given an order to the captain and then 
potentially becoming implicated in case of an incident or 
accident. Thus, VTSOs preferred to ask clarification ques-
tions making sure that the vessel had understood the traffic 
situation (“Advice should be used only when nothing can 
go wrong”). However, the VTSOs sometimes expressed a 
need to communicate beyond their role as an information 
service (e.g., “You cannot leave the fairway in that direction. 
You have to pass two more green lighthouses before you 
go to starboard”—VHF radio communication). In this case, 
the VTSO said that perhaps the ship could have gone clear 
through the channel it was heading to with the particular 
draught it had, but that it was still “not the procedure” (see 
Sect. 4.2.2). This example was one of managing traffic rather 
than informing it, but in some circumstances the VTSOs 
find it difficult to avoid changing their approach and giving 
instructions to manage the traffic situation: “If you tell them 
that for some reason ‘you cannot arrive at the pilot station 
earlier than 11.00’ and you can see that they will be there 
at 10.30 and you call them (…) still they don’t do anything 
until you basically say… You have to tell them to stop!”. 
The VTS instructor suggested that having a level of VTS 
service at their centre able to instruct ships would potentially 
increase safety but decrease efficiency as a result (possibly 
interfering with the bridge team’s decisions) and put more 
responsibility and blame on the VTSOs if an incident or 
accident were to occur.
Besides ways of communicating with vessels, another 
example of control by the VTS was their role of authorizing 
ships to leave berth or hold current position. It was also 
the VTS who decided and coordinated the ships’ anchor-
age points or pilot boarding points. The VTS would also 
advise ships to take a tug boat, and if these ships chose not 
to do so, the VTS would report it to the SMA and the coast 
guard. This advice provided by the VTS, then, served as an 
instruction.
Speed limits or channel deviations were also advised by 
the VTS when temporary events were taking place in the 
fairways (e.g., diving operations or port construction activi-
ties). The VTS would also serve as the intermediary for 
coordinating certain operations, as the example of vessels 
reporting a navigational buoy that was out of order. The ves-
sels would not directly call the Maritime Safety Information 
(MSI); instead they would contact the VTS so that the VTS 
could take charge of informing the necessary authorities. 
The same applied to when a vessel wanted to order lines-
men: it would be the VTS who contacted them for the vessel 
before approaching berth.
4.2  Judgement, trust and overreliance
A part of the VTSOs’ work is the prediction of possible 
traffic scenarios and outcomes based on the information at 
hand. However, the VTSOs expressed the challenge of ship 
and shore operators having different perceptions of reality 
and perceived that it should be easier for the captain or pilot 
onboard the ship to predict certain movements and events in 
the fairway than for the VTSO: “The pilot onboard, he can 
see ahead. You cannot see ahead here [at the VTS]”. For this 
reason, the VTSOs must rely on the pilots and bridge officers 
to follow the rules: “Hopefully they’re following the rules. 
Then we don’t have to do nothing”.
When monitoring a ‘vessel’s behaviour’ and/or com-
municating with its bridge officer, the VTSO produced a 
judgement of their competence/skill to communicate effec-
tively and/or navigate the vessel safely. Different factors 
influenced this judgement, which in turn determined how 
much trust/reliance the VTSO could put on them or how 
much additional attention they would require to ensure that 
no incidents or accidents would occur. Stakeholders were 
trusted depending on the way they communicated over the 
VHF radio and how they gave an impression of being skilled 
mariners or not. The experience and local knowledge of the 
pilots and captains who passed through the area frequently 
were almost taken for granted, even though VTSOs admitted 
that this might be a risk on its own: “It depends on what you 
rely on, but they could, of course, sometimes make mistakes 
as well”.
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4.2.1  Language proficiency, acquaintances and frequency 
of visits
Factors like the captain’s nationality and how prone he/
she was to being proficient in the English language, to 
how well a VTSO knew the captain or pilot he/she was 
talking to, were aspects that influenced the VTSOs’ reli-
ance on the vessel. One example was of a Dutch vessel that 
skipped some of the necessary information when reporting 
inbound to the VTS, such as intended route and destina-
tion, but the VTSO maintained trust in the vessel’s bridge 
team based on perceived language proficiency: “(…) you 
know, he’s Dutch, he knows English (…)”. Difficulties 
communicating in the official language, English, by the 
bridge officer on duty usually alerted the VTSOs to keep 
a closer look at that vessel. That is, perceived language 
difficulties decreased the VTSOs’ trust in the vessel, since 
the VTSOs did not feel secure that the communication 
between them had been clearly understood by the bridge 
officer or that he/she would proceed with what was agreed 
upon: “You know you have to try to use other different 
words or possibly try to use the same phrases all the time 
if they don’t understand you (…). You keep it simple (…). 
Of course you make a judgment”.
For foreign ships, a respondent reported to replace 
Swedish geographical names with numbers or use a land-
mark reference point that was more recognizable to com-
municate locations to ships. Cultural differences also had 
an impact on judgement: “I’m not saying that there are 
certain nationalities that are better or worse, but it’s the 
way they think”.
In circumstances where the VTSO and the bridge officer 
or the pilot onboard were well acquainted, the VTSO could 
get a quicker sense of trust in that they had the navigational 
expertise necessary and the situation under control. For 
instance, when asked if the VTSO was satisfied with a par-
ticular vessel’s behaviour, the VTSO responded: “Not really, 
because I think it’s easy for him to slip up to the other side. 
But I know these captains; they are very familiar with the 
area without pilots”. Also, a ship’s high frequency of visits 
to the same VTS area was usually indicative of having more 
local knowledge, to the extent that some had a pilot exemp-
tion licence. The more frequent those visits were, the more 
the VTSOs relied on those ships to follow normal patterns 
of behaviour and communication in the area: “You cannot 
stop observing them, because anything can happen. But, of 
course, I think every human being makes a judgement based 
on someone appearing a lot of times than a single vessel 
coming once a year”. The ships that passed through the area 
more sporadically and that asked the VTS questions that the 
VTS did not expect to be asked, such as where the reporting 
point was located or what to report, made the VTSOs more 
apprehensive about that ship’s future behaviour.
4.2.2  Norms, patterns and expectations
The VTSOs monitored their area on the basis of traffic pat-
terns, of normal behaviour both in terms of navigation and 
communication (e.g., making “turns in a planned way”; 
“Normally the vessel turn starts here on the way”; “Nor-
mally they go here”). Vessels deviating from what was con-
sidered “normal” usually caught the attention of the VTSOs 
as potential “troublemakers”. What was considered “nor-
mal” was not just based on formal regulation but also on 
informal norm such as the experience of the VTSO and the 
expectation of how vessels should act in certain situations 
in the area.
Another informal norm was the recognized and accepted 
preferences of certain captains, pilots and/or shipping com-
panies that were regularly navigating through the area, even 
when these preferences and behaviours differed from the rest 
of the traffic (e.g., pilots on a particular cruise line always 
took a shortcut, described by a VTSO as “(…) a little bit 
tight. They could use the fairway better, they really could. 
But that’s really common”; “I know they [pilots] always go 
there [over the marked shallow areas] (…) But if it had been 
another type of vessel, I would have reacted”. So, consistent 
behaviours deviating from the norm sometimes became the 
new norm for that particular captain or pilot, thus becom-
ing accepted and even expected by the VTSOs. It was also 
reported that different vessel types and sizes have different 
communication patterns more specific to their own pro-
cedures and experiences, causing a communication gap 
between them.
4.3  Closed‑loop versus open‑loop communications
Communication ship–ship within a VTS area consists of 
communicating intentions, negotiating, compromising, and 
reaching an agreement of when and how they will meet in 
the fairway and affect each other’s navigation plans. The 
VTS overhears this back-and-forth communication over the 
VHF radio, which in some respect verifies if the traffic situ-
ation is under control. This communication of intentions 
(which should be a closed-loop communication) usually 
gave the VTSO enough reassurance that the ships would 
keep their safe distances (“It’s good that they communicate 
to get the confirmation”; “That’s important, to have a closed 
loop”; “It’s not so much about the distance, at least not in the 
fairways (…). I am more relying on that they have actually 
communicated, so that I can know what they are doing”; 
“That’s good. Now they have talked to each other and the sit-
uation is clear”). The VTS has the role of intervening when 
closed-loop communication does not take place or is dis-
jointed in time, in order to clarify what has been shared and 
agreed upon. However, this was more easily done when the 
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VTS was already involved in that communication and even 
then it was not always deemed necessary or appropriate.
As per the closed-loop communication model, when there 
is VHF radio communication between the VTS and a vessel, 
the VTSO should repeat the information provided until the 
bridge officer of that vessel repeats what he/she just heard 
followed by an “understood”, “well-received” or “copy 
that”. However, sometimes the ships simply responded 
“understood”, “well-received” or “copy that” without repeat-
ing what they heard. This is, thus, not a guarantee that the 
information was indeed understood as the VTSO intended it 
to be. The VTSOs could sometimes hear the same situation 
happen over the VHF radio between two ships, and they did 
not commonly intervene straight away. They would give the 
ships time to act on what they had agreed upon, as this is 
part of the VTS’ protocol.
The VTSOs often continued to rely on the bridge offic-
ers despite their open-loop communications ship-shore or 
ship–ship, even though it was understood that this could 
potentially result in misunderstandings. They chose the 
trade-off of an ambivalent communication to some extent 
(knowing that in most cases the ships indeed understand 
the information properly and have the right behaviour after-
wards) over creating a hostile environment over the VHF 
radio by questioning the bridge officers or correcting how 
they communicated.
Along with the closed-loop communication, IMO’s 
SMCPs (IMO 2001) are to be transmitted in English so that 
anyone implicated in a certain traffic situation listening in 
on the VHF radio can equally understand what other parties 
involved are communicating despite everyone’s nationalities 
and origins (see also Praetorius and Lützhöft 2012). It was 
observed, though, that some of the communication happened 
in Swedish, mainly that between fishing boats, pilots and 
VTSOs, as fisherman were reported to seldom master the 
English language, and pilots and VTSOs sometimes wanted 
to be able to communicate without having an impact on eve-
ryone else listening in.
5  Discussion
Safety, efficiency and environmental protection were the 
main high-level concerns in maritime operations. In the 
VTS, safety was described as being dependent on (a) the 
communication of updated local information to the vessels 
(also found in Brödje et al. 2010; de Vries 2017), ensuring 
that this information is well understood to provide the over-
view of the local traffic; and (b) the monitoring of traffic to 
make sure it follows the “normal patterns” (also found in 
Brödje et al. 2010), accounting for all parameters that can 
affect safety.
Being ashore and having limited information sources to 
build situational awareness and trust (Brödje et al. 2010; de 
Vries 2017), and to anticipate vessel movements (Praetorius 
et al. 2012), the VTSOs’ work depends on the screen-based 
visualization of traffic and also greatly on VHF radio voice 
communications with ships and between ships (Brödje et al. 
2010; de Vries 2017). VHF radio communications are useful 
to capture the intentions of the vessels and provide verbal 
assistance (Brödje et al. 2010; Praetorius et al. 2012; van 
Westrenen and Praetorius 2012). However, it was found 
that there are communication limitations linked to (a) the 
ambiguity of the VTS role; (b) the judgements and expecta-
tions of traffic and communication behaviours that VTSOs 
can make from ashore; and subsequently (c) the trust versus 
overreliance that the VTSOs build on the mariners. These 
limitations ultimately have an impact on how the VTSOs 
approach the vessels’ bridge teams and provide them with 
assistance (see Fig. 2).
As depicted in Fig. 2, in protocol operations, inbound 
vessels report predefined information when entering the 
VTS area and the VTS confirms and relays through VHF 
radio relevant local traffic and weather information as 
deemed appropriate. Monitoring the vessel movements on 
the screens will then provide sensor information on whether 
a vessel is following the route that was communicated, the 
regulations and recommendations for the area. But as shown 
in this study, and adding to the results of Brödje et al. (2013), 
non-technical communication factors and limitations exist 
beyond the protocol, regulations and technical solutions and 
have an influence on VTS decision-making and assisting 
ships.
First, vessel reporting and communication protocols 
happen within an environment of VTS role ambiguity (see 
Sect. 4.1) in the sense that there are contradictions in the way 
the INS role is performed in practice. There were occasions 
where the VTSOs felt they needed to be more intervening 
with vessels than usual to avoid compromising safety or 
breaching the “normal patterns” for the area. At the same 
time, there were occasions where even a breach would not 
prompt the VTSOs to intervene, and this sharpened inter-
vention boundaries and intrinsic hierarchies of the INS role. 
Moreover, it was perceived by the VTSOs that foreign ves-
sels felt uncertain with the different roles of different VTS 
centres. This calls into question the services provided by 
VTS centres and their directives on the assistance of traffic 
(also see Brödje et al. 2013).
Second, the VTSOs will make judgements of the skills 
of the vessels’ bridge teams based on: whether the vessels’ 
navigational behaviour is following normal patterns for 
the area, for the traffic circumstance, vessel characteris-
tics (see Sect. 4.2.2) and frequency passing through the 
area (see Sect. 4.2.1); not only what is being communi-
cated from the vessel (or among vessels) but also on how 
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(Brödje et al. 2010) and when it is being communicated; 
and language proficiency (see Sect. 4.2.1). What was con-
sidered “normal patterns” of navigational behaviour was 
not defined equally for all ships or circumstances. This was 
based on the VTSOs’ experience of ship types and of the 
local waters, but also on the knowledge and expectations 
of the navigational preferences of specific captains who 
navigated through the area more frequently. Although the 
VTSOs were aware that, for example, being acquainted 
with the mariner on the bridge or the vessel’s frequency 
of visits did not guarantee a trouble-free passage, or that 
the bridge officers’ English language proficiency did not 
directly imply being skilled or not (Brödje et al. 2010), this 
had a clear and almost inevitable impact on the VTSOs’ 
level of confidence in the bridge officers (also see Praeto-
rius and Hollnagel 2014).
Based on these aspects, the VTSO will build an aware-
ness of the situation onboard and either trust the vessel’s 
bridge team or choose to keep a closer look-out on them. The 
VTSO may then intervene to provide additional navigational 
information to try to improve the situational awareness of 
the bridge team (see Sect. 4.2). In situations of trust, the 
VTSO will sometimes leave communication loops open or 
refrain from interfering, even in dubious situations, not to 
overstep or seem prepotent (see Sect. 4.3) (also see Brödje 
et al. 2013), which once more highlights the issue of ambi-
guity with the VTS’ role. While trust contributes to safety 
of navigation (Bruno and Lützhöft 2010; Brödje 2012), the 
factors that determine this trust are not free of uncertainty.
The overreliance on the vessels and shortening the VHF 
radio communications down to open loops of information, 
the incoherence of VTS service levels, the specificities of 
different VTS locations, and the uncertainty in the expecta-
tions of the mariners can compromise safety as a goal. How-
ever, being a loosely coupled system, the looseness of the 
safety boundaries of navigation may go unnoticed for some 
time (Dekker and Pruchnicki 2014). Still, the limitations 
identified must be assessed and control loops maintained, 
for the maritime system to accomplish their goal(s) at their 
full potential, without failure (Dekker and Pruchnicki 2014).
Maintaining closed loops in communication is all the 
more important when there is lack of information technol-
ogy integration and the information being exchanged among 
ship and shore operators is conflictive. Recent studies have 
found that parameters such as the draught of a vessel can be 
communicated to the VTS from different sources or stake-
holders in the system (e.g., port agent, port controller, bridge 
officers), and by multiple means (e.g., AIS transponder, VHF 
radio, email, web forms or telephone). This information is 
not always updated and may even be conflictive, causing 
the VTSO to have to/prefer to check it directly with the ship 
captain via VHF radio to decrease the uncertainty of the 
sources and of the information received (Costa et al. 2018; 
de Vries 2017).
It is an idea to consider for the maintenance of safety that 
the role and training of VTS be internationally harmonized 
to guide the work of VTSOs (Nuutinen 2005; Praetorius and 
Hollnagel 2014; Praetorius and Lützhöft 2012; Praetorius 
Fig. 2  Non-technical factors in information processing and their impact on trust and decision-making in everyday operations (no accidents were 
observed during fieldwork)
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et al. 2012), and within it highlight the aspects and effects 
of trust on the safety performance of the system (Bruno and 
Lützhöft 2010; Brödje et al. 2013; Cox et al. 2006; Sætren 
and Laumann 2015; Schöbel 2009). VTS homogenization 
may, however, face the challenge of disparate resources 
available between centres to achieve the specific goals of 
the VTS area: different work shifts, local traffic density and 
information, how the VTS works together with other local 
services such as the ports and pilots. Thus, how different 
centres adapt to their special circumstances must be weighed 
in (Nuutinen 2005; van Westrenen and Praetorius 2012).
This is a time where numerous technological develop-
ments are being made towards the digitalized dissemination 
of information such as the maritime example of e-navigation 
by the IMO (2014). Information technology developments 
may transform the structures of the maritime stakeholder 
network and affect the need for and the ways in which mari-
time actors communicate with each other if more decision-
making power is shifted to technology (Costa et al. 2018). 
The softer aspects of communication may be taken into 
account in information technology development so as to 
accommodate the needs of the shore operators and their 
tasks, or even potentially alleviate current communication 
limitations and maximize the capacity of the VTS to assist 
vessels with maintaining safety. The disregard for such softer 
aspects in technological development, on the other hand, 
may instead exacerbate existing communication barriers or 
create new ones.
6  Conclusions
The purpose of the fieldwork was to explore the operations 
of the VTS with regard to how the VTSOs communicated 
with ships and other shore operators, and how decisions 
were made to assist the traffic in maintaining safe passage 
in port areas. The data suggested non-technical aspects of 
information processing and communication that influence 
the VTSOs’ judgements, expectations and decision-making 
in the assistance to ships and reflect challenges in the role of 
the VTS. This paper complements previous research (Bruno 
and Lützhöft 2010; Brödje et al. 2010, 2013; de Vries 2015; 
Praetorius and Hollnagel 2014, 2015, Praetorius et al. 2012) 
in the deeper understanding of everyday VTS operations 
through naturalistic field observations, specifically with 
regard to the non-technical factors which lack documenta-
tion in the literature. Future research is planned to capture 
technical and non-technical communication aspects from the 
perspective of the mariners.
This research reflects the ways in which the VTSOs adapt 
to the challenges of limited information sources for situ-
ational awareness and trust building (Brödje et al. 2010; de 
Vries 2017), communications and predictions at a distance, 
and lack of role directives (Brödje et al. 2013), as well as 
how this impacts their judgements and assistance to ships. 
Specifically, this may contribute to authorities such as IALA 
in their considerations towards the homogenization of the 
delivery of VTS around the globe, with regard to the extent 
of intervention by the VTS, their flexibility and adaptability 
to local circumstances, and to trust building between VTS 
and bridge teams.
This qualitative research also contributes to practical 
knowledge to manufacturers, policy makers, educators and 
trainers on considering the whole spectrum of communi-
cation—not only technology-related but also the softer 
aspects—as an important part of the design of ongoing and 
future e-navigation support systems (Bruno and Lützhöft 
2010; Praetorius and Lützhöft 2012), policy developments, 
VTS education and training programmes for the augmen-
tation of safe and efficient passage in dense and confined 
waterways. Such changes will affect the ways in which 
maritime actors work (de Vries 2017), how they obtain and 
process information, as well as how they communicate. The 
factors identified here represent an opportunity for future 
shore-based assistance organizations, regulations, train-
ing programmes and technical solutions to further support 
operator needs.
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